Best course for U.S. in East China Sea is to deter China activity

Tensions are rising in the East China Sea as the modernizing Chinese navy is getting more active there. With China’s entry, the Western Pacific, where the U.S. 7th Fleet in conjunction with the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force has provided peace and stability, is turning into a competitive arena for sea control.

China’s claim to the Senkaku Islands, currently under Japan’s administrative control, has been accompanied by increasing Chinese provocations, involving both civilian and military vessels and planes.

The question of sovereignty over these islands involves only the People’s Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan) and Japan, but the United States has interests in maintaining the status quo.

The best course of action for the United States is to raise its rhetorical commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands in order to send a clear message to China that military and pseudo military means to alter the status quo will not be tolerated by the United States. A series of comments by U.S. officials, including then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell since late 2012, did exactly that.

Given the increasing U.S. trade with China and China’s increasing diplomatic weight in global politics, accommodationist voices in the United States have called for U.S. neutrality on the Senkaku Islands question. However, active U.S. presence in the region and verbal commitment to Japan’s defense have always been part of the equation, which has found a balancing point on the status quo of Japanese administration of the islands only verbally protested by China.

China’s increasing military and pseudo-military provocations in East China Sea have been ongoing phenomena during the last eight years and are not short-term responses to particular Japanese actions. China has committed itself to altering the status quo. China’s dispatch of its missile destroyers to the disputed Chunxiao (Shungyo) gas field in 2005, after rejecting Japan’s request for sharing geological data and protesting Japan’s decision to issue a permit to a domestic firm for test drilling on the Japanese side of the median line, attests to China’s newfound boldness in its regional diplomacy.

When historical debates over the sovereignty of the islands are inconclusive at best, morality and historical justice cannot guide U.S. policy. Instead, the best course of action for the United States is to follow its own interests.

The Chinese claim to the Senkaku Islands cannot be separated from its claim of extended continental shelf all the way to the Ryukyu Trough. Furthermore, China’s ambitious plan for sea control to the first and second archipelagic lines, eventually reaching Guam, has been known to the U.S. Navy. China’s claim to the first line reaching Okinawa would likely exceed control of continental shelf resources and entail restrictions on freedom of navigation in the East China Sea, as China has demonstrated through its harassment against U.S. military ships in the South China Sea in 2009. It is of U.S. interests to deter China’s unilateral attempt to expand its maritime sphere of control.

The risk of accidental naval or air skirmishes between China and Japan over the disputed resource areas in the broad East China Sea can be reduced with credible U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense. The United States would be better off deterring China in the first place than having failed to deter it and getting dragged into a conflict.