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It is simple yet complex. It is both old and new. It is dead, but lives on.
For a football offense that leans so heavily in one direction — to the forward pass — the run-and-shoot isn’t always what it seems. It generates absolute love-or-hate opinions, but is loaded with intriguing contradictions.
Maybe we can call the University of Hawaii football team’s born-again four-wide-receiver attack Paradox in Paradise.
OK, maybe not.
But there is no doubting the Rainbow Warriors need something to jump-start the program that hasn’t had a winning record since 2010. And history shows that unconventional approach worked once.
With just a few bumps in the road, the run-and-shoot was a key to consistent winning for most of its 13-year run, the first nine seasons under June Jones. Some of the success came even after the offense’s most famous coach left for Southern Methodist; the last winning season was on coach Greg McMackin’s watch, with Bryant Moniz running and shooting to slots Kealoha Pilares and Greg Salas on the way to UH’s third conference championship in the run-and-shoot era.
Make that the first run-and-shoot era, since head coach Nick Rolovich is now re-installing the offense he thrived in as a quarterback in 2001. He’s hoping to recapture some of the magic that had the Warriors breaking NCAA records, contending for the Heisman Trophy and playing in a major bowl game.
‘Almost like cheating’
What makes this offense capable of such achievements, without a roster full of highly recruited talent?
First, there’s the formation. The predominant run-and-shoot alignment has two slotbacks and one running back instead of the tight end and two running backs common in more traditional formations. The idea — as it is with other spread offenses — is to use more of the field, maximizing quickness advantages and mitigating size disadvantages.
“We’re talking about taking a minimum of four wideouts and spreading them out so you immediately can attack with five receivers up the field. It spreads the field so it eliminates big, powerful folks overwhelming you,” said Mouse Davis, who is credited most with developing the foundation of the run-and-shoot passing game nearly 50 years ago. “Little guys that can run. They’re not big enough to assault anyone. So we fed ’em the ball and let ’em go.”
Like other schemes, the run-and-shoot will often put a player in motion before the snap to try to create a mismatch, and get an idea of what the defense has in mind.
But the thing that historically separated it from almost all other offenses and mystified defenses is what happens after the snap. Receivers adjust their pass routes on the fly in the run-and-shoot — after the play has started.
“You have built-in coverage beaters,” said Warriors quarterbacks coach and passing game coordinator Craig Stutzmann, who was a run-and-shoot slot receiver at Saint Louis School and UH. “If they run cover-2 this is your cover-2 beater, if they run man this is your man beater. You don’t have to change the play, because it’s organic. In essence, when the quarterback and receivers are on the same page, there are built-in beaters for every defensive concept.”
If the receivers and the quarterback make the correct reads, a receiver will always be open. That’s the theory, anyway.
“There are just a few baseline plays,” said Jason Rivers, who starred in the run-and-shoot as a wide receiver at Saint Louis School and then UH. “As intricate an offense as it was, it was simplified. You get to the point where you run as fast as you can, and you still make the right read. When you have four receivers on the field and you all know exactly what spot you’re going to and the defense has no idea, it’s almost like cheating.”
Setting up the run
The Warriors made it look easy in 2006 and 2007 with Colt Brennan passing to Rivers, Davone Bess, Ryan Grice-Mullen and several other capable, experienced run-and-shoot receivers. Brennan threw an NCAA record 58 touchdown passes in 2006. In 2007, Grice-Mullen (1,372), Bess (1,266) and Rivers (1,174) were all over 1,000 yards in receiving.
When it is at its very best, the run-and-shoot can move the ball on the ground, too. It does the opposite of conventional offenses that run to set up the pass.
“We don’t have a concept of any coverage scaring us,” Rolovich said. “Unless you have four guys who can play man-to-man against all four of our guys, and you can put pressure on our quarterback before he can get the ball out. Then people try the other way, rush three and drop a bunch. That’s when it’s good you have a super back – he’ll roll up some yards when they do that.”
In 2006, four receivers caught at least 10 touchdown passes. But the team’s leading scorer was running back Nate Ilaoa. He rushed for 990 yards and 13 touchdowns and caught passes for 837 yards and five scores. As a team, the Warriors ran for 1,651 yards — and many of Ilaoa’s receiving yards came on shovel passes that Jones considered his offense’s version of a draw play.
Passing to set up the run is a run-and-shoot staple, and a wide-open passing game that spreads a defense horizontally and vertically creates plenty of running room.
“Colt would drop back like he was throwing deep, and the defensive linemen thought they’re finally going to get a chance at Colt, and then we slip a little screen,” said Ilaoa, who was one of 10 players on the 2006 team to be drafted by the NFL.
“Defensive ends then had to be hesitant to rush down the field, knowing they couldn’t go full-blown after Colt,” Ilaoa said, adding that UH’s offensive tackles took full-advantage. “Tala (Esera) and Dane (Uperesa), now they’re really nailing these guys who aren’t going down the field.”
Brennan remembers defenses being confused and intimidated.
“The run game was so productive it almost seemed like it was unfair,” he said. “Here we had this high-octane passing offense, and the defense had to respect the run. I remember watching defenses that didn’t want to play. It got to the point where if someone’s assigned defender didn’t (rush), they would try to knock out whoever was rushing. It made them not want to rush us because they were getting hit too hard. It was too much punishment to get to us.”
From a lineman’s perspective, “less is more,” said Brian Smith, UH offensive coordinator and center on the 2001 team.
“Protection is all-important, but there’s not a large number of protections to learn. There are just two runs. You can focus on fundamentals and recognizing defenses. It allows the offensive line to play with a lot of confidence. When you see things happen before they do, you have a lot of success.”
Also, UH’s linemen were injured less often in the run-and-shoot than in other offenses.
“It’s the nature of the (passing) game — there’s less people in the box, there’s less piles,” Smith said. “A lot of it’s who we’re recruiting, too. We like to recruit more athletic guys, guys who stay on their feet. Those are guys who are going to stay healthy. Guys that are thick and big and fall down, they’re not going to stay healthy, and they won’t fit the offense that well.”
The offense didn’t fit the NFL that well in the postseason when a few teams used the run-and-shoot at football’s highest level in the late 1980s and 1990s, often with Davis and/or Jones directing the attack. Jones guided the Atlanta Falcons to the playoffs as head coach in 1995, but no team using the run-and-shoot as its primary offense ever won an NFL postseason game.
Creative breakthroughs
Still, though the run-and-shoot died long ago in the NFL in name, it should at least be considered an organ donor.
The concepts of spreading the field with a fleet of receivers adjusting their routes during the play are alive and well at football’s highest level.
“You’d be hard-pressed to find an NFL team without four wideouts somewhere in their playbook,” said former UH quarterbacks coach Dan Morrison, now an assistant for Jones with Hamilton of the CFL. “That’s a credit to Mouse, one of his creative breakthroughs.”
One of Jones’ was to put the quarterback in shotgun formation. Rolovich will certainly add some new wrinkles to his first run-and-shoot playbook as a head coach.
The basics don’t change though: four wideouts, sight-adjusted routes.
And, quite often, plenty of yards and plenty of points.
“It’s a great offense,” Jones once said, grinning. “Unless you don’t like scoring touchdowns.”
HOW THE OFFENSE LINES UP
University of Hawaii football enjoyed singular success in the run-and-shoot era. One of its most prolific practitioners at quarterback, Nick Rolovich, is reviving the pass-first offense with its four wideouts this season as head coach.
FORMATION
The biggest difference between the run-andshoot and conventional offensive alignments is the addition of two slot receivers replacing the tight end and one of the two running backs.
CONCEPT
By spreading the field and changing routes based on the defense’s reaction, the run-and-shoot creates mismatches and, in theory, open receivers on every play.
STRENGTH
The run-and-shoot is considered an equalizer for teams that face bigger, stronger defenders. And because of the potential for big plays on every down, it is exciting for players and fans.
WEAKNESS
Because of a relative disregard for down-and-distance, ball control and field position, the run-and-shoot can put extra strain on its own defense.
FOR THE RECORD
Some of the school’s more significant team marks set during UH’s run-and-shoot era of 1999-2011:
SINGLE-SEASON
12
MOST WINS (2007)
6,178
PASSING YARDS (2006)
62
TOUCHDOWNS (2006)
46.9
POINTS PER GAME (2006)
SINGLE-GAME
741
YARDS GAINED (vs. Army, Nov. 22, 2003)
72
POINTS (vs. BYU, Dec. 8, 2001)
10
TOUCHDOWNS (vs. BYU, Dec. 8, 2001 and at Fresno State, Oct. 14, 2006)
SEASONS IN THE SUN
Hawaii had eight winning records and appeared in eight bowl games, winning four of them, in its 13 years featuring the run-and-shoot coached by June Jones, left, from 1999 to 2007 and Greg McMackin from 2008 to 2011.
1999: 9-4
2000: 3-9
2001: 9-3
2002: 10-4
2003: 9-5
2004: 8-5
2005: 5-7
2006: 11-3
2007: 12-1
2008: 7-7
2009: 6-7
2010: 10-4
2011: 6-7
Total: 105-66 … .614 winning percentage
Since: 21-55 … .276 winning percentage
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