"All right China, come out with your hands up; we’ve got you surrounded!"

When one reads about the U.S. "pivot" to Asia, it is almost always cast in terms of countering China’s rise, as if it — and everything else that Washington does in Asia — is always all about China. But the only thing new about America’s pivot toward Asia is the word pivot. The idea of focusing on Asia during this, the "Pacific Century," dates back to President Bush — President George H.W. Bush’s new world order, that is. Ever since the end of the Cold War, U.S. presidents have been acknowledging the growing importance of Asia and the need for America to remained engaged in this critical region in our own national interest. For a large part of this period, China was largely an afterthought.

From our vantage point, recurring Obama administration assertions that "America is back" run the risk of being counterproductive. There is the insinuation that a nation that "returns" has either left or might leave again; that its commitment comes and goes. We don’t want to be sending that message to allies, partners, and potential adversaries. It also confuses other governments in the region. In conversations throughout Asia, friends have asked us what this new policy means. They worry that a "surge" in the U.S. presence is a cover for more aggressive and potentially destabilizing policies; that Washington is preparing a more confrontation policy toward China. (That doesn’t mean that they don’t worry about China and its intentions; but they want the U.S. to be a comforting presence, not an instigator.)

Take the Darwin deployment, for instance. Beginning in 2012, 250 U.S. Marines will begin six-month rotations to Darwin, Australia, for joint training, with the number eventually growing to 2,500 by 2016. Beijing was quick to protest the announcement, calling it "a manifestation of a Cold War mentality," and warning, in a People’s Daily editorial, "If Australia uses its military bases to help the U.S. harm Chinese interests, then Australia itself will be caught in the crossfire." Someone needs to hand our Chinese colleagues a map. Last we looked, Darwin was some 2,500 miles from the nearest Chinese landmass; that’s one heck of a crossfire!

To say that it’s not all about China is not to say that it is not at all about China. In some fundamental ways, Chinese statements and actions in recent years have made it at least in part about China. 2010 in particular was the "year of living arrogantly" for China’s People’s Liberation Army; 2011 was for the most part a period of backing off, but by then the damage to the credibility of China’s "peaceful rise" had been done; concerns about Chinese intentions — and the need to respond to them — have risen exponentially.

Take recent discussions between Washington and Manila about increased defense cooperation, for instance. While the U.S. bases agreement with the Philippines ended two decades ago, the alliance remains strong. U.S. ships routinely visit the Philippines, our militaries exercise together on a routine basis, and U.S. advisors continue to provide training and assistance in support of Philippine counterinsurgency operations in the South. Sustaining and building upon such support is hardly front page news. But growing Philippine concerns about Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea make it front page news, and significantly increase Manila’s incentive both to increase the U.S. presence and to remind China about the defense commitments that have always been inherent in the alliance.

In short, America’s "return" to Asia is overblown; we never left. And the primary factor behind the continuing focus on Asia is the awareness that Asia’s economic, political and security significance is likely to grow, regardless of the nature of China’s rise; the U.S. is committed to remaining "all in" in Asia (as President Barack Obama pledged in Australia) because it has been, is, and will continue to be in America’s national security interest to do so. It’s not all about China and would be less about China than it is today if China would become more transparent about its claims and intentions and military modernization plans in the future.

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Ralph A. Cossa is president and Brad Glosserman is executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS (pacificforum@pacforum.org), a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. (www.pacforum.org).