Proposal to cut U.S. nuclear weapons by 80 percent is asking for trouble

The Obama Administration’s proposal to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons by 80 percent — even if never effected — is both reckless and dangerous for at least two key reasons.

Before explaining, however, let me clear the deck of one issue: The world would, indeed, be safer if there were no nuclear weapons at all. However, total zero is not possible at this time because the nuclear genie is out of the bottle.

Any nation dedicated to getting nukes can do so, as economically strapped Pakistan and North Korea have already proved. And, since nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapon known to mankind, the allure of owning them will exist regardless of nuclear disarmament by the United States or anyone else.

Now, why is the 80 percent proposal reckless? First, it could actually promote nuclear proliferation in two sets of countries: allies and adversaries.

For more than 50 years, the U.S. has guaranteed the security of allies — the 27 other members of NATO, plus Japan, South Korea and Australia — by extending nuclear deterrence, the nuclear umbrella, to them. Many of these nations could have readily built nuclear weapons for themselves, but have not done so because they have relied on the umbrella.

Let’s take look at Japan as an example. Japan is in a rough neighborhood. North Korea has nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. China is modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems. Japan frequently has had testy relations with both. In the face of these realities, Japan could have built nuclear weapons, and, indeed, debated doing so. Instead, it has sought and obtained repeated assurances from the U.S. that we will use all of our resources, including nuclear, if need be, in defense of Japan. Even when Japan has called for a world without nuclear weapons, it has said that steps toward disarmament should "… not in any way diminish the national security of Japan or the United States and its allies."

The 80 percent proposal may cause some allies, including Japan, to rethink whether the U.S. nuclear umbrella is sufficient and trustworthy. To the extent that it does, this directly undermines U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals.

The 80 percent proposal also sends the wrong signal to adversaries and potential adversaries. It says, in effect, the U.S. is not interested in maintaining a robust nuclear force. Adversaries might figure, "If the U.S. is going to small numbers, we will be able to counter or match the U.S. force much more readily." And they’d be right.

The second reason that the 80 percent proposal is reckless is that it is being made at a time of turmoil, when our nuclear deterrent still has an important role to play. The U.S. defense budget is being drastically cut and conventional forces drawn down. At the same time, there is great uncertainty about threats. The nuclear weapons developments in and saber-rattling by Iran, the behavior of nuclear-armed North Korea, the extensive modernization of nuclear weapons by both Russia and China, the growing rift with nuclear Pakistan — all of these situations require that we maintain our weapons of last resort to deter others from taking advantage.

The U.S. should be reasserting that it is committed to keeping our nuclear forces strong and intact, not talking about eviscerating them.

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Dr. Kathleen Bailey is a former assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. She now lives in Anahola, Kauai.