The Hawaii Emergency Management Agency officials caused deep damage to the public trust as a result of the Jan. 13 false alarm about an incoming ballistic missile, leading to a panic that lasted 38 minutes before the all-clear was given.

The full scope of this debacle was unveiled this week, casting serious doubt on the state’s capacity to shoulder this responsibility.

And it lends weight to an argument being made by Hawaii’s U.S. Sen. Brian Schatz that the custody of nuclear alerts should belong to the federal government. Last week Schatz said he would introduce bipartisan legislation that would improve the emergency alert system and assign the federal government sole responsibility for alerting the public of a missile threat.

This does merit further discussion, ironing out how the state might be involved, given its control of most of the emergency alert infrastructure. Today, in fact, the state will run its usual monthly test of that siren system, including the wailing attack warning tone. Given the revelations of two separate but equally severe reports of what actually happened Jan. 13, the state ought to rethink the wisdom of making such missile siren tests routine.

On Tuesday the state announced that it had fired on Friday the staff officer who incorrectly dispatched a warning of an actual attack, disseminated through a cellphone texting network.

Officials also announced that Vern Miyagi, the HI-EMA administrator, resigned Tuesday, following one executive departure on Friday and a third facing suspension without pay.

This was a housecleaning that was overdue — and were it not for intense federal scrutiny and pressure of the two reports, one has to wonder whether the full story would have come to light at all.

That full story is a horror, revealing ineptitude that had put the public at risk from the start.

There were two reports, one an internal investigation ordered by state Adjutant General Maj. Gen. Joe Logan and headed by retired Brig. Gen. Bruce Oliveira. The second probe, from the Federal Communications Commission, is still ongoing but preliminary results also were issued.

That federal report concluded that the Jan. 13 alert went out not as a slip but because the warning officer believed the islands actually were under attack; additionally, poor communication between shift supervisors compounded the confusion.

And, according to the state’s internal investigation, the warning officer had confused drills and real events at least twice before and had undergone counseling.

Neither Gov. David Ige nor any of the HI-EMA officials had revealed that publicly. Instead, they insisted that corrections had been made, seemingly wanting to move on.

Further, it’s mystifying why someone who had demonstrated such a shortcoming continued at this important post. This had been a matter of agency record, and should have been corrected through the worker’s reassignment.

The direction of the drill was flawed as well. It began and ended with a scripted disclaimer phrase “exercise, exercise, exercise” — but elsewhere departed from that script, boosting the odds that confusion would result.

Brig. Gen. Moses Kaoiwi, who is taking charge of HI-EMA on an interim basis, must ensure the agency firmly implements changes to correct “insufficient management controls,” the poor software design and other weak points identified by Oliveira and the FCC.

This includes filling vacant positions as soon as possible, as well as designing and conducting proper training and exercise protocols that plainly have been lacking.

Whoever is appointed as a permanent replacement for Miyagi must have significant experience in disaster management plus leadership to earn back public confidence in HI-EMA. After taking charge, he or she needs to reach out to the community as soon as possible and explain how the agency has been set back on track.

The public has the right to know that they won’t be subjected to such incompetence again.