The Pacific islands is the United States’ gateway to Asia: Its proximity, strategic significance and enduring political ties present extraordinary opportunities. At the same time, the United States needs to address major challenges in the region. The most pressing are the threats posed by climate change and global pandemic. Others include aid dependency, racial inequity, strategic competition and rising authoritarianism.

The American homeland extends to the Pacific islands, with the state of Hawaii sitting at the apex of the Polynesian Triangle. The American homeland also includes the U.S. Pacific Territories and Minor Outlying Islands. Although sovereign states, the U.S. government asserts that the American homeland even extends to the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau as a consequence of their Compacts of Free Association (COFA).

The connectivity of the American homeland to the Pacific islands is reflected in the Unified Command System. Hawaii is the only American state not to fall under USNORTHCOM. Like the rest of the American homeland in the Pacific islands, it falls under USINDOPACOM (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command). This connectivity is also evidenced by regional governance structures. The U.S. Pacific Territories are Observers of the Pacific Islands Forum.

At the global level, the United States remains the superior military power. However, there is an urgent need to reinforce its military advantage over strategic adversaries. These include China, North Korea, and, to a lesser extent, Russia.

The ongoing entanglement of the United States in “forever wars” has presented all three with an opportunity to close their gaps in military and intelligence capabilities with the United States. China, in particular, has seized on that opportunity. Over the last two decades, China has modernized its capabilities and expanded its overseas posture; in parallel, it has pursued military advantages across a range of emerging technologies.

Today, China not only has the ability to threaten the American posture across much of Asia — more importantly, it has the ability to threaten American forces and footprints across much of the American homeland in the Pacific islands.

Consider Chinese long-range ballistic missiles. These weapons already pose a credible threat to American forces and footprints in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam and Palau. It is only a matter of time before they also pose a credible threat to American forces and footprints in Hawaii.

The U.S. Congress recognizes that there is a compelling need to reinforce the military advantage over major power competitors in Asia and the Pacific islands.

To be established in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) will incentivize the Department of Defense to make investments that widen the gap in military capabilities vis-à-vis major power competitors in Asia and the Pacific islands. Moreover, it will call on the department to reassure American allies and partners in the process.

Admittedly, the 2021 NDAA will only provide a modest increase in investments for USINDOPACOM. However, it will open the door to billions of dollars in future funds that can be used to finally realize the pivot to Asia.

In the words of its bipartisan framers, PDI is no panacea. The next administration will need to develop a strategy for restoring the absolute superiority of the United States over major power competitors in Asia and the Pacific islands. Otherwise, the full potential of this generational opportunity will not be realized.

To develop such a strategy, the president of the United States will need to make principled choices about what kind of deterrence should be pursued. Unfortunately, that will prove difficult for President Donald Trump, who is unwilling, and perhaps unable, to make principled choices in foreign policy.

Michael Walsh is a regional policy adviser who served on the Expert Work Group on the INDOPACOM Theater Redesign Study at the United States Army War College; the views expressed are his own.