Column: As U.S. leaves Afghanistan, the blame game begins

For the second time in 50 years the American public is presented images of Americans desperately fleeing an “allied” country’s hostile takeover by a government opponent. As happened with the “Saigon Moment of 1975,” today’s catastrophe has given birth to a blame game for responsibility, most of it partisan. Most politicians and their supporters will blame the other party’s leadership but after 20 years of bipartisan direction over the war effort, that should fall on deaf ears.

America lost Afghanistan for the same reason the Soviet Union lost; it tried to impose centralized governance on a diverse population that passionately defends local sovereignty. Both governments relied on a narrow band of self-serving elites to function. The American experiment differed only in basing it on democratic rather than Marxist-Leninist principles. Afghan kings limited their role to external relations and arbitrating disputes among the internal groups. America’s allies against the Taliban joined that fact to regain their local autonomy. The centralized that followed triggered a shifting array of political alliances and opposition along community lines that prevented the national-level buy-in required to sustain a post-American presence. As happened in 1989, the elites will take their plundered wealth and flee.

That reality will not prevent the blame game’s continuance. Those seeking favor with the political elites or to enhance their ideological credence will blame the military. Military supporters will note the military won the battles and held the Taliban at bay for 20 years.

Unfortunately, as America should have learned from Vietnam and its own American Revolution, who wins the battles is irrelevant.Civil wars over national governance are won politically. The military is a facilitator to that process but, barring a political solution or unlimited will to sustain the war, not the determinator. Moreover, when a military collapses as rapidly as Afghanistan’s, the reasons tend to be complex but have roots in political failure. For example, telling unpaid troops to buy their own food neither inspires confidence nor loyalty. In fact, they tend to surrender rapidly to whomever will feed them.

The blame runs across America’s political spectrum. Successful counter-insurgency has always been accomplished through politico-economic action and demonstrated good governance. The Taliban is harsh but consistent and presently, uncorrupt. America’s Afghan political arrangements focused on issues important to domestic U.S. constituencies while ignoring what mattered to most Afghans. The U.S. had the will to fight but never forced its Afghan client-elites to eliminate judicial and police corruption, making the Taliban’s harsh but predictable and equitable jurisprudence seem better. The Afghan Army fought well when alongside or advised by U.S. troops who ensured they received vital supplies. Our departure left their support to Afghan’s corrupt officials. The results were inevitable.

The American voters’ lessons are clear. First, nation building is more than a military operation. Voters must question their leaders’ assumptions about all future regime-change interventions. For those to work, political and economic arrangements matter as much as those for security. They are intertwined. Reject any officials’ statement that ignores that reality or promises “no boots on the ground.” Removing a government creates a power vacuum that violent players will exploit. Deploy security or accept the results (e.g., Libya).

However, imposing a U.S.-vision of centralized government creates a long-term commitment that includes security (e.g., military forces). Nation-building is neither fast nor cheap, even under ideal circumstances. America should undertake it only if its vital national interests are at stake, the objectives are realistic, stated clearly, and the resources required to achieve them are presented honestly and committed fully. A lot of people have died in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya because our leaders didn’t do that before committing our and our allies’ youth to war.

Honolulu resident Carl O. Schuster is a retired Navy captain and former director of operations at U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center.