Column: The power of myth in the context of war

Some years ago, I had the privilege of teaching a UCLA class that was paired with a class at University of California-Riverside taught by professor Ivan Strenski, who holds the chair in religious studies there. We were linked through “distance learning,” which allows each class and teacher to interact with the other, united by a full-size screen. During the course, I took over for a few weeks while Ivan traveled to Ekaterinburg, Russia, to teach Russian Ph.D.s in a George Soros-funded program.

Teaching religious studies is not the same as teaching theology. The history — and sociology — of religions inform us about the more nonrational impulses of human group behavior in matters of ultimate concern, life, death and conflict.

In a talk he gave on jihadism, Huston Smith, a famed scholar of comparative religion, said that religion was the strongest factor impacting human history. Humans are storytellers and they search for meaning in myths about the origin of their world. What happens in myth can become a model for their meaningful actions, for good and for ill.

Today for the first time, I noted in two mainstream media outlets some recognition by journalists of the power of myth in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. And Rodger Baker, a senior geopolitical analyst at Stratfor/RANE intelligence service, wrote that he had been “wrong about Ukraine” when he used only logic to conclude initially that Russian President Vladimir Putin would not try to grasp all of Ukraine. He admitted that “… failing to appreciate the potential weight of political ideology, will lead to incorrect forecasts.”

The mainstream media characterized Putin’s speech before invading Ukraine as “rambling,” indicative of an “unhinged” mind. Putin expressed his ultimate faith in Russian nationalist spirituality. He professed his belief that Russia and Ukraine are one nation, and warned that any attempt to decouple them would be met with military opposition. Before he could initiate the invasion of Ukraine, though, Putin needed to rally the Russians behind his aggression by narrating Russia’s origin and destiny in mythological terms. While Putin’s views may be strange to the West, Baker reminded us that Putin’s worldview is well-known to Russians.

Professor Strenski explains that Putin’s mindset is based upon the Slavic myth of three colors: “Putin’s moves to incorporate Belarus and now Ukraine define what that Pan-Slavic worldview dictates, since each represents one of the mythical Rus brothers, each of which is believed to have founded one third of mytho-historical “Rus” — composed in sum of white, red and black Rus: Belo (“white”) Rus; then Ukraine, Kiev as Krasny (“red”) Rus; and Russian Federation, Muscovy as Black Rus.” To save the red brother from alienation by the West, Putin is saying he must reclaim Ukraine.

We need to listen to what Putin says to decode his moves. We need to understand his reliance on the myth of Russian/Ukrainian “spiritual space.” History teaches us that a Kievan Rus kingdom arose on the Dnieper River around 879. Putin says instead that “Since Time immemorial, the people living in the south-west of what has historically been Russian land have called themselves Russians and Orthodox Christians.” In fact, the founders of Kievan Rus came from Scandinavia, traded in Slavic slaves, and did not become Christian until 988.

However, the myth predominates because Putin believes that “Ukraine is an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space,” despite the fact that after Kievan Rus fell, the Ukrainians lived in the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth until Peter the Great took Ukraine at the Battle of Poltava in 1709. Now, Putin, a latter-day avatar of Peter the Great, wants to take Ukraine again. The only way to get into “Putin’s head” is to understand the myth on which his vision of greater Russia is based.

We cannot forecast Putin’s moves strictly on a rational basis, because he is imbued with religious zeal and activated by a national origin myth. For him, absorbing Ukraine is a religious imperative. Baker also reassures us, however, that when leaders act on the basis of ideology and forsake rational strategies, they are most likely to suffer bad outcomes.

Jean E. Rosenfeld, Ph.D., is a historian of religions, particularly of religion and political violence.