Kim Jong il is dead and his "great successor" has been anointed. This much we know. Beyond this, we’re mostly guessing.

It’s also a pretty safe bet that Kim’s son, Kim Jong un, has been accepted by the ruling elite as the official face of the new leadership. They have a vested interest in a stable power transition; their own personal safety and survival is inextricably tied to regime survival. It’s a safer bet that Jong un will not have the degree of absolute power and influence that his father did; no next-generation leader ever does, especially one still in his 20s and untested.

Where the guessing really starts is in determining who the power(s) behind the throne will be. Kim Jong il’s chosen regent — his brother-in-law Jang Sung-taek — is the odds-on favorite, but how trusted Jang really is by the military remains to be seen. As a result, no leadership picture is likely to be more over-analyzed than will be the line-up at Kim’s December 29 memorial service, officiated over by Kim Jong un.

No outside guests are being invited. This could be because the powers that be don’t think Kim Jong un is ready yet for foreign scrutiny. It could (but probably doesn’t) mean that a serious power struggle is going on behind the scenes. Or they might just be concerned no one of importance would show up. The debate in Washington and Seoul will center on whether a condolence message should or shouldn’t be sent. I vote for a carefully worded note from each, focused on our collective willingness to engage in dialogue with the new leader.

The real questions are, what does Kim Jong il’s death mean in terms of eventual denuclearization and the prospects for reform? My guess is that Pyongyang already had a game plan in place taking them through the U.S. and South Korean presidential elections in November and December respectively, and that the new leadership will proceed along that charted course. It would be extremely bold for any new leader or leadership team to veer too far from the chosen path, at least initially.

What that chosen path is remains anyone’s guess. It likely includes another round of U.S.-DPRK and North-South talks, followed by the eventual resumption of Six-Party Talks in late spring or early summer. If rumors of a U.S. food aid-for-uranium enrichment freeze deal are indeed true, we should have no illusions that the best we will get is a freeze at the known facility at Yongbyon, and not at the suspected additional facilities elsewhere.

While the Six-Party Talks are likely to resume at some point, their stated intent — denuclearization of the Korean peninsula — will remain a pipe dream. If so, why go back to the negotiating table? The most direct answer is because no one has a better solution acceptable to all parties.

It’s also true that if you "won’t buy the same horse twice" — a favorite phrase in Washington — then you really can’t start again from scratch. The September 2005 joint statement is already in place, and no one wants to try to recreate (or repurchase) this agreement.

The six-party talks had been aimed at making things better (i.e., denuclearization); now the objective will likely be to keep things from getting worse. The appearance of progress, even if none is actually achieved, is becoming more compelling, especially in an election year.

There is an unproven assumption that when the North Koreans are talking, they are not shooting at people. There is also rampant speculation that the new leadership will have to establish its bona fides by doing something aggressive. I don’t buy it. The South Korean and U.S. military increased their alert status in response to Kim’s death. My guess is that this would be the best time for the respective militaries to enjoy Christmas leave. The odds that the new leadership would do something provocative during the transition period seem low.

The most likely future path will be for the North to cautiously continue down the path laid out by Kim Jong il, including a resumption of U.S.-DPRK and North-South dialogue, leading to a resumption of six-party talks, where they will once again attempt to get us to buy the same horses for a third or fourth time, while throwing in at least one new horse: the already revealed portion of their uranium enrichment program.

Over the long term, there is hope that Kim Jong un will, if he listens to regent Jang, take North Korea down the path of Chinese-style reform. Beijing has expressed unqualified support for Kim Jong un’s leadership, in part because of concern over stability, but apparently also on the belief that Jang will be a "reformer." This might relieve the suffering of the North Korean people over time, but it will do little to promote the cause of denuclearization. This will remain a long-term challenge and a low priority for Beijing and Pyongyang, even as it continues to drive U.S. and South Korean policy.

Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington (www.pacforum.org).