Let me begin with a brief lamentation for the Constitution, then suggest the trajectory of the Iraqi-Syrian tragedy.

In his Sept. 10 national address, Barack Obama reluctantly became the fourth president since Bush I to bomb Iraq. His decision was forced by ISIL’s explosive seizure of territory in Syria and Iraq and the brutality of its beheading of American James Foley on Aug. 20.

Framed as "counterterrorism," Obama proposed three initiatives: the formation of a broad coalition, air strikes to "degrade" ISIL, and the training of moderate Syrian insurgents.

He also called on Congress to "give us additional authorities and resources to train and equip these (Syrian) fighters."

Congress did, in a Sept. 18 amendment to a continuing resolution.

The brief lamentation for the Constitution is that Congress did not declare war. Instead, it "authorized" the president to do what he had already decided to do. In 2011 for Libya, the president also did what he had decided to do. But in 2011, he did not request a congressional "authorization," saying that Libya was not a "war."

The president always does what he decides to do; Congress sometimes "authorizes" what he has already decided to do, but only when the president requests Congress to "authorize" what he has already decided to do.

This circular game has been played since World War II, the last officially declared war.

Unfortunately, the Constitution does not say that Congress shall "authorize" the president to do that which he has already decided to do. It says Congress shall declare war.

Perhaps, there is a problem here that needs to be corrected. Perhaps, the endless wars since 2001 would have been less endless if the Constitution had been followed.

Turning from lament to tragedy, what is the outlook for Iraq and Syria?

In Iraq, ground forces exist. These forces consist of reorganized Iraqi army units, Kurdish peshmerga, Shia militia and a reborn "Anbar Awakening" of the Sunni tribes, relabeled Iraqi "National Guard."

With air support — a powerful morale booster — this pick-up force should push ISIL’s overextended forces back into Syria over the next year or so. It should also stabilize Iraq sufficiently to allow for a messy accommo- dation to keep the country together. Iraqi nationalism is not dead, and none of the countries that border Iraq will countenance a break-up of the country.

Meanwhile, Syria will bleed. It will take a year or more to train the 5,000-man brigade of "moderate" insurgents. Consequently, little will change in the coming year, except that a "degraded" ISIL will be concentrated in Syria as it is pushed out of Iraq.

With air support, a brigade is a powerful force. It can confront, disperse, and, perhaps, defeat ISIL. This happened in Afghani-stan in 2002 with the Taliban. However, a brigade, especially without air support, is insufficient to overturn the Assad regime.

What a brigade might accomplish in late 2016-2017, after the dispersal of ISIL, is to consolidate the opposition forces in Syria sufficiently so as to enforce "moderate" control of eastern, Sunni Syria. Then, a stalemated war weariness and international pressure might force a negotiated settlement in late 2017-2018.

The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and its not-fully-satisfactory outcome is the model — a messy compromise that keeps the country together because nationalism is not entirely dead and because none of the surrounding countries will countenance a break-up.

Meanwhile, more refugees will flee and casualties will increase.

Compounded tragedy is the inadequate word to describe the mid-term outlook.