I really get riled up, right down to the core — to the na‘au, as we say locally — when I hear certain government leaders and officials play the blame game during crises, such as who is to blame for the COVID-19 pandemic flu crisis and shortages we are facing.

Decades ago while serving as a second lieutenant in the Army, I learned a valuable anecdote about leadership. As the story goes, an outgoing commander told his successor that he placed two sealed envelopes in the unit safe to be opened when times were really bad. Months later, bad things began to happen: Unit readiness declined, disciplinary cases were on the rise, and morale was bad.

At a low point, the unit commander remembered the two envelopes. He opened the first, which read: “Blame me, your predecessor, for all the bad things that have happened.” And, that he did. For a short while unit conditions improved, then bad things began to happen again. In desperation, the unit commander opened the second envelope, which read: “Make out two envelopes.”

The point to this story is about accepting responsibility. Placing blame on your predecessor or on a prior, political administration when things go wrong, is an indicator of poor leadership. It’s always easy to look back and wish that things were done differently, such as keeping pandemic flu plans up to date, having test kits available, making more ventilators, and stockpiling more N-95 masks in the fight against COVID-19.

In hindsight, I should have left two sealed envelopes to be opened when things got bad for those who succeeded me at State Civil Defense, now the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency.

The first would have read: Make sure you conduct missile alert drills only under closely controlled conditions (“No touch that button”). The second envelope would have read: Review and maintain plans, as these were developed to meet the likely natural and man-made hazards the state will encounter.

One of these hazards is a pandemic flu outbreak, one of 15 National Planning Scenarios that federal and state governments had to plan for. I hear no one speaking to the collaborative efforts and planning that were done among government agencies at all levels and the private sector that contributed to the Department of Health’s 2006 State Pandemic Influenza Operations Plan. Although the plan was focused on the potential outbreak of avian influenza (H5N1), it was updated in 2008 and provided a framework for the state’s response to the 2009 swine flu (H1N1).

The pandemic flu plan — including supporting plans to address hospital surge capacity requirements, mass prophylaxis and distribution points, identifying alternate care sites for the sick, and plans involving the use of the Strategic National Stockpile — came at a cost to Hawaii taxpayers. What is the status of these plans? I cannot find the Department of Health’s State Pandemic Plan on its website.

In 2009, the City and County of Honolulu received a large grant (in the millions of dollars) from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Urban Areas Security Initiative, for Regional Catastrophic Planning. The city’s leadership then chose to spend these funds toward developing pandemic plans for all counties and Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP) for county and state agencies. Are these plans updated and used?

In contrast, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention left at least one envelope for tough times. The CDC website (see Emergency Preparedness) contains a trove of pandemic documents, including the 2017 Update to HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan. These are detailed, reflect much effort in planning by government and private industry, and provide relevant information to the public.

For the blame-gamers: Make out two envelopes.

Ed Teixeira, of Kamuela, was vice director of Hawaii State Civil Defense from 1999 through 2011.